European banks have experienced significant changes in the type of entity that owns them (another bank, an individual or a family, a non-financial company, an institutional investor, a government, a foreign entity, a domestic entity…). In this paper, we look at the influence of ownership type changes on performance. Working with a panel of commercial banks from 17
Introduction
The global financial crisis has led to the partial nationalization of banks in many developed countries, which reverses a pattern of consistent declines in government ownership of banks throughout the world since 1970. Although the impact of such ownership changes on bank performance has received a lot of attention (see Clark et al., 2005 for a literature review of the effects of bank privatization on bank performance such as Beck et al., 2005; Bonin et al., 2005; Haber, 2005; Nguyen and Williams, 2005) , the consequences of the resulting changes in bank ownership structure on risk have yet to be adequately explored. A change in bank ownership can indeed take various forms. An initially private bank can be acquired and controlled by a government or by another private entity of a different type (another bank, an individual or a family, a non-financial company, an institutional investor, a foreign entity, a domestic entity). In this paper, we investigate whether the changes in the type of controlling shareholders differently affects bank profitability and risk.
The recent wave of consolidation and the rise of institutional investors in Europe has also affected the ownership structure of banks. While the main motivation for consolidation comes from the desire for growth, institutional ownership is mainly driven by value maximization concerns by possibly following hit and run strategies. Because of the different motivations underlying changes in bank ownership, it is important to distinguish the nature of the changes, which may generate differences in the level of bank risk taking. Furthermore, although controlling shareholders may have different risk preferences depending on their type, whether or not their desired level of risk can be achieved will also depend on their monitoring power and on internal governance mechanisms.
Family-controlled banks, for example, may be more averse to risk taking due to their goal of transferring the firm to the next generation (Anderson et al., 2003) . This may also be due to their inability to diversify their wealth outside the bank. Nevertheless, they may end up taking more risk due to managerial and capital constraints.
Corporate-controlled banks are prone to participate in related lending, which could be both advantageous and risky. While insider lending may be a rational response to overcome asymmetric information issues, tunneling could also lead to inefficient capital allocation and higher risk. Moreover, an industrial group which owns a bank will act in the interest of the entire group, regardless of the possibly negative outcomes for the bank. Therefore, banks might pursue riskier strategies when they are controlled by a non-financial firm. It could also be argued that non-financial companies might not be sufficiently diversified to pursue high-risk strategies in the banks they control. In addition, corporate owners often invest in firms for strategic reasons, for example, to delegate part of their activities or to take advantage of potential synergies and spillover effects between the owner and the controlled firm (Tribo et al., 2007) . Thus, corporate-controlled banks may also have a preference for low risk.
The main goal of institutional investors is to optimize their financial gains, which they can achieve by holding a diversified investment portfolio (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Aggarwal et al., 2010) . Institutional investors might therefore have a strong preference for higher risk-taking by the banks they control as long as net present value is positive. Compared with family, corporate and bank owners, institutional investors usually have an arm's-length relationship with a firm. They are relatively less involved in the decision-making process and rather than spending time and resources to improve the performance of a company, they are more prone to play hit and run strategies (Ingley and Van der walt, 2004) . As a result, their influence within a bank they control is likely to be lower compared to that of other controlling owners. However, institutional investors with significant voting power could also shape risktaking at the bank's level. In terms of shareholder control and expertise in processing information and monitoring managers, such investors have a much stronger influence than atomistic individual investors.
There is no clear theoretical prediction on the risk preferences of banks controlled by other banks. When a bank owns another bank, the important risk-return relationship and strategies are expected to be handled by the parent company, and not at the subsidiary level.
On the one hand, banks as shareholders might encourage relatively conservative risk-taking strategies for both safety-net reasons and reputation concerns. On the other hand, banks, especially when they are larger, tend to have diversified portfolios, which may increase their preference to take risk when controlling another bank. Consequently, in terms of their ability to achieve the desired level of risk, insider knowledge of business provides banks with a strong influence on the strategic choices and governance mechanisms to align management with their objectives.
Several studies have found that state ownership of banks leads to inefficiency and poor performance (e.g La Porta et al., 2002) . One reason is that management in these state-owned banks sometimes comes under pressure to serve particular political interests. In cross country analyses, Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000) find evidence that a greater extent of state ownership of banks is associated with a higher likelihood of banking crises in developing countries during the 1980-1995 period. Barth et al. (2004) find that state-owned banks have a higher ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, but do not find a significant impact of state ownership on banking crises, bank development and performance as measured by net interest margins and overhead costs. Using bank level data, Berger et al. (2005) and Iannotta et al. (2007) find that state-ownership of banks is associated with relatively high risk taking as measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the standard deviation of banks' asset returns, and Z-scores.
Our paper complements the literature on the relationship between bank ownership structure and performance (risk/profitability) by further exploring the linkages between changes in bank ownership type and changes in terms of profitability and risk. We thus investigate banks whose type of ultimate owners have changed and examine how such changes have affected bank risk taking. We also look into how the type of the acquirer influences bank risk-taking and profitability. Rather than investigating ownership structure and ownership changes per se, we explore changes that lead to a different type of ultimate owner or controlling entity 2 . To our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the implications of changes in ownership type on the risk-taking behavior of banks 3 which is an issue of major importance for bank stability.
Working with a panel of listed and non-listed commercial banks from 17 European countries over the 1998-2011 period, we find that banks that experience a change from one type of owner to another type do not on average differ significantly in terms of profitability and risk when compared to banks with stable ownership type. However, the risk and profitability of banks that experience a change in ownership type are significantly affected after a change takes place and the type of new owner plays a significant role in explaining the observed changes. We find that when the acquirer is a non-financial company, the state or an institutional investor, the level of risk increases after the change in the ultimate owner while the level of profitability remains unchanged. Conversely, when the acquirer is a bank, we find that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases. Banks acquired by a different type of owner during the global financial crisis do not perform better or worse than they did before.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the sample and the variables used in the study along with descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the method used while section 4 shows the results of our econometric investigation. Section 5 reports robustness checks and discusses further issues. We conclude in section 6.
2 We do not consider changes for which the owner's type remains the same (i.e. a family-owned bank is taken over by another family, a bank controlled by a non-financial firm is controlled by another non-financial firm…). Such changes are not expected to alter risk-taking behavior in our framework. Moreover, ownership changes where the owner type remains the same are not observed in our data.
3 Taboada (2011) investigates the impact of changes in bank ownership structure on the allocation of capital by looking into privatization but not the other dimensions of ownership structure. Table 1 for the distribution of banks by country and ownership type).
We also consider a subsample restricted to banks for which financial and ownership information is available for at least 7 consecutive years. This allows us to compute some of our risk measures which require information 3 years before and 3 years after the changes occurred. This subsample consists of 113 banks which experienced a change in their ownership type between 2002 and 2008 and 292 banks which did not experience any change over the same period.
[Insert Table 1] 2.2 Bank risk and performance measures Table 2 provides detailed definitions of all the variables used in our study. We consider several measures of bank risk and performance based on accounting data that are commonly used in the research literature. We compute two standard measures of asset risk:
the standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA) and the standard deviation of the return on equity (SDROE) both based on a moving three-year window (for year t we consider year t, year t-1 and year t-2). Higher SDROA and SDROE indicate higher risk taking. We also consider three credit risk measures: the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans (NPL), the ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans (LLP) and the ratio of loan loss reserves to net loans 
the additional change(s) (i.e the second or third change) only when the elapsed time between the changes is at least three years and when the owner controls the bank during at least two consecutive years. We also consider an alternative measure Change_After, which takes the value of one after a change in the type of bank ultimate owner takes place over the [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] period and zero before or if no change occurs in the type of the ultimate owner. This is to investigate possible differences after the change takes place. We further consider a third measure, Before_Change, which is a dummy that takes the value of one before a change in the type of bank ultimate owner takes place over the 2002-2010 period and zero after or is zero throughout if no change occurs in the type of the ultimate owner. Our aim here is to capture possible differences that could explain the change in ownership in the first place. Eventually, we consider a fourth measure Change_Year, a dummy which takes the value of one the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period. This variable allows us to track the exact timing of the observed changes.
In order to capture the changes in the type of the ultimate owner, we consider several categories of acquiring owners: banks, individual/family investors, non financial companies, states, institutional investors, foreign entities, domestic entities. For each category of acquiring owners X, our measure denoted Ch_X is defined as a dummy variable, which takes the value one if X became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner and zero if otherwise. For example if X is a bank then Ch_Bank is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if a bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by either a family, a company, an institutional investor or a state, and zero otherwise.
Control variables
Several bank-specific control variables are considered. We account for size differences by considering the natural logarithm of total assets, LNTA. The relationship between bank size and risk is not clear-cut. Larger banks should have greater ability to diversify their asset portfolio and therefore be less risky. Nevertheless, because of the presence of too-big-to-fail policies, larger banks might have higher incentives than small banks to take more risk. Also, large banks appear to be more efficient than small banks, although studies on scale economies in the banking industry are inconclusive (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) . Moreover, size appears to reduce funding costs (McAllister and McManus, 1993; Hughes and Mester, 1993) .
We also account for leverage differences (total equity to total assets ratio, EQUITY). A well capitalized bank will benefit from lower funding costs because its default risk is perceived as lower (Berger, 1995) . Furthermore, the risk-shifting incentives induced by deposit insurance decreases with the level of capitalization (Brewer and Mondschean, 1994) , and hence the equity to asset ratio is often used as a proxy for managerial risk preferences (Hughes and Mester, 1998) . We also control for liquidity differences by using the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (LIQUID), diversification differences (net non interest income to total operating income, NNII) and managerial efficiency differences (ratio of total operating expenses to total operating income, CIR). We further control for possible country-specific effects by including country dummies (COUNTRY). Alternatively, we introduce variables to capture the strength of supervisory regime ( [Insert Table 2] 2.5 Descriptive statistics Table 3 presents the distribution of the type of bank ownership changes across all the years covered by our sample. We observe a strong heterogeneity among the different types of changes within each year, which enables us to analyze implications in terms of bank risk and profitability. We observe that the most frequent case is when a bank becomes the ultimate owner by replacing another type of entity (Ch_Bank) and the least frequent cases are privatization (Ch_Privatization), acquisition by a foreign ultimate owner of a bank previously owned by a domestic entity (Ch_Foreign) and acquisition by a domestic ultimate owner of a bank previously owned by a foreign entity (Ch_Domestic). [Insert Table 4 ]
In Table 5 , we examine the risk and profitability profiles for banks which experienced a change in the type of their ultimate owner and provide indicators computed after (Column A) and before (Column B) the ownership change. The table shows the indicators for the 113 banks that experienced changes in ownership type and subsamples based on the 10 types of changes for our variables of interest. The level of risk (SDROA, SDROE) is on average higher after the change occurs. However, the level of profitability (ROA) is lower after the ownership change. We also find significant differences in terms of risk-adjusted return (ADJROA and ADJROE) before and after the changes. On the whole, we observe that changes in the type of the ultimate owner are associated with higher levels of risk-taking without increasing the level of profitability or returns. The results are mainly driven by banks which are acquired by a non-financial firm (Ch_Company) and to lesser extent by banks falling under the control of governments (Ch_State) and institutional investors (Ch_Institut). When we consider the risk and performance profiles of banks that experienced a change in the type of the ultimate owner, as in Table 5 , but without normalizing the variables of interest, the results remain unchanged and are even stronger for the full sample.
[Insert Table 5] In table 6, we report the descriptive statistics of the changes in bank risk/performance after and before the changes in the ultimate owner type. 
Where _ it DZ is either the difference between the average level of profitability over the 3 years subsequent to the change (t+1, t+2, t+3) and the average profitability 3 years before (t-1, t-2, t-3) or the difference between risk and risk-adjusted profitability on a three-year window after and a three-year window before. In equation (2), the means and standard deviations are computed on the basis of t+1, t+2 and t+3 (after) and t-1, t-2 and t-3 (before). A positive value of 1  indicates higher risk/performance after a change in the type of the ultimate owner and in contrast, a negative value indicates lower risk/performance after a change in the type of the ultimate owner. We note that there is one measure of _ DZ for each bank i which experienced a change in ultimate owner type over our study period. For banks with the same type of ultimate owner throughout our study period, the calculation of the change in risk taking/performance is similar to _ DZ i.e the difference between the means (and standards deviations) of our profitability/ risk measure on a three-year window after (for year t we consider year t+1, year t+2 and year t+3) and on a three-year window before (for year t we consider year t-3, year t-2 and year t-1). For banks whose ownership type never changes, the dependent variable is annually introduced in the model based on the difference between the means (and standards deviations) of our profitability/ risk measure on a three-year window after (for year t we consider year t+1, year t+2 and year t+3) and on a three-year window before (for year t we consider year t-3, year t-2 and year t-1). Consequently, our
Change_Year dummy takes the value of one the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period.
Third, we also investigate whether the nature of the change in the ultimate owner's type influences banks' risk taking behavior and performance strategies differently according to the type of the acquiring ultimate owner. For this purpose, we use the model shown in equation 
Results
We use panel estimation techniques with random specific effects to estimate equation
(1). The results are presented in Table 7 . We do not find any significant difference between the two types of banks when considering performance, risk and risk-adjusted profitability measures throughout the sample period (Change). However, when considering the Change_After variable we find that banks which experience a change in ownership type exhibit higher risk (SDROA) than other banks while their risk-adjusted profitability (AJROA)
is lower (although at 10 % significance level only). Hence, banks whose ownership type changes appear to be riskier than other banks but only after the change takes place. Moreover, such a difference cannot be observed before the changes take place as indicated by the absence of any significance of the Before_Change variable. Hence, changes in ownership type can apparently not be explained by differences in risk or by lower profitability and/or riskadjusted profitability and hence by their ability or not to optimize their portfolio risk-return.
[Insert Table 7] 6 There is some overlap between ownership type change and controlling country change (Foreign vs. Domestic).
Therefore, in order to avoid singularity, we remove Ch_bank_private, Ch_privatization, Family_Ch, Ch_Domestic, Ch_Foreign in the estimates of equation (3). That is, we consider only 5 types of ownership changes instead of the 10 types described in Table 2 .
We use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to estimate Equations (2) and (3) corrected for heteroskedasticity following White's methodology. The results are presented in Table 8 .
The regression findings show differences in bank risk-taking (asset risk) following the change in the ultimate owner's type. Our result indicates that while banks which experienced a change in the type of entity that controls them are more risky after the change than before (D_SROA and D_SROE), they are not found to perform better after the change takes place. They are even performing more poorly than before as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficients of the change in ROA (D_ROA) and of the change in risk adjusted profitability (D_AJROA), respectively, (although at the 10% significance level only). Such results highlight that such banks engage in riskier activities are not eventually rewarded by higher profitability.
When considering equation (3), we find that the nature of the acquirer matters in explaining the changes in profitability and risk. When the acquirer is a non-financial company (Ch_Company) or an institutional investor (Ch_Institut), the level of risk increases while the level of profitability and risk-adjusted profitability remains unchanged. Moreover, when the acquirer is the state, the level of risk increases while the level of profitability measured by D_ROA decreases (although at the 10% level only). We do not find any significant difference in terms of risk and profitability after a family acquires a bank. Moreover, when the acquirer is another bank, the results show that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases after the change in the type of the ultimate owner. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that a change in the type of the ultimate owner is associated with changes in risk-taking behavior and/or performance strategies depending on the nature of the acquiring owner.
[Insert Table 8 ]
Robustness check and further issues
In this section, we check the robustness of our regression results and examine further issues. 7 First, we focus on the subsample of 113 banks that allows us to isolate the banks which fell under the control of a different type of ultimate owner and for which the data is reported exhaustively for at least 7 years. When focusing on this subsample, the results regarding our variables of interest remain identical. We find that when the acquirer is a non- The results regarding our variables of interest remain identical.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was threefold: first, to analyze whether banks that are acquired by an entity of a different type than the one in place before acquisition (bank, individual/ family, non-financial company, institutional investor, foreign entity, domestic entity) behave differently, in terms of risk and performance, than banks whose owner's type remains identical ; second to examine whether the risk and performance of banks whose owner's type changes are different before and after the change ; and third to examine the role played by the type of the acquirer and the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the relationship between changes in owner type and changes in risk and performance.
Working with a panel of European commercial banks, we do not find significant differences in terms of risk and risk-adjusted profitability between banks with changing ownership type and those characterized by stable ownership type. However, after the change occurs, banks which experience a change in ownership type take more risk without increasing their profitability. This suggests that although such banks engage in riskier activities, they are not eventually rewarded with higher profits.
Analyzing whether the nature of the acquirer matters in explaining the changes in profitability and risk, we find that when the acquirer is a financial company, the state or an institutional investor, the level of risk increases but profitability is unaffected after the change takes places. Conversely, when the acquirer is another bank, we find that the level of riskadjusted profitability decreases after the change in the type of ultimate owner. Our findings indicate that the type of the acquirer matters in explaining changes in profitability and risk.
Looking more closely at the changes that occurred during the global financial crisis 
D_AJROE
Return on Average Assets Return on Average Equity Standard deviation of return on assets' rolling window over 3 years (current year and 2 previous consecutive years) Standard deviation of return on assets' rolling window over 3 years (current year and 2 previous consecutive years) The ratio of Nonperforming loans to Net Loans The ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Net Loans The ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Net Loans ROA/SDROA ROE/SDROE Changes in ROA which equal the difference between the average level of ROA over the 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and the average ROA 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1). Changes in ROE which equal the difference between the average level of ROE 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and the average level of ROE 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1). Changes in SDROA which equal the difference between the SDROA 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1). Changes in SDROE which equal the difference between the SDROE 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1). Changes in AJROA which equal the difference between the AJROA 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1). Changes in AJROE which equal the difference between the AJROE 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1). A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period.
Banks ownership variables

Ch_Bank
A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by either family, non-financial company, institutional investor or state, and zero otherwise. Ch_bank_private A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another private shareholder (non state owned), and zero otherwise.
Ch_Family
A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by either bank, non-financial company, institutional investor or state, and zero otherwise.
Family_Ch
A dummy variable that equals 1 if family owned bank is acquired by another type of owner, and zero otherwise. Ch_State A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by either bank, non-financial company, institutional investor or family, and zero otherwise. SP is an index of anti-director rights for the country and is ranged from 0 for the country with the greatest shareholder right to 6 for the poorest right. The index is added one point when (a) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (b) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting; (c)cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (d) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (e) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (f) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholders meeting. Source: Djankov et al. (2008) SOURCE: All variables are the authors' calculations from Banksource data except where indicated. Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentage except ASSETS which is in million of euros): LOANS = net loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY = equity/total assets; CIR = total operating expenses/total operating income; LLP = loan loss provision/net loans; NPL= non performing loans/net loans; ROA = return on average assets; ROE = return on average equity; LIQUID = liquid assets/total assets; OBS = off balance sheet/ total assets; TA = total assets (millions Euros); NII= net interest income/ total operating income; NNII=net non interest income/total operating income; SDROA= standard deviation of the 3-year rolling windows ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the of the 3-year rolling windows ROE; AJROA= ROA/SDROA; AJROE= ROE/SDROE. ; Change_Year= dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period.; Ch_bank is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank acquired a bank that was previously owned by another type of shareholder and zero otherwise; Ch_Bank: a bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another type of entity (either family, company, institutional investor or state); Ch_bank_private: a bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another private shareholder (non state owned; Family_Ch : a family became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Family: a family-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner; Ch_Company: non-financial company became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_State: state became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Institut: institutional investor became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Privatization: state-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner.;Ch_Foreign: foreign investor(s) became the ultimate owner(s) of a bank that was previously domestic-owned; Ch_Domestic: domestic-owned bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously foreign-owned. Variable definitions : D_SDROA= difference between the standard deviation of ROA 3 years after the change and 3 years before the change; D_SDROE= = difference between the standard deviation of ROE 3 years after the change and 3 years before the change ; D_ROA = difference between the return on average assets 3 years after the change and 3 years before the change; D_ROE = difference between the return on average equity 3 years after the change and 3 years before the change; D_AJROA)= difference between AJROA 3 years after the change and 3 years before the change ; D_AJROE= difference between AJROE 3 years after the change and 3 years before the change. 
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